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Abstract
In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices
have been found to decline. We study auctions of ancient Chinese
porcelain recovered from shipwrecks. In these auctions there are very
long sequences of lots of identical objects. We ﬁnd that the average
price decline is smaller in long sequences. It is especially large for the
ﬁrst pair of lots auctioned; it is also larger when the price of the previ-
ous lot was larger than (the upper bound of the range of) the pre-sale
estimate of the previous lot and when the number of items in lots that
follow each other increases. As a consequence, it appears that sellers
may have some control over the sequence of prices and therefore on
their revenue. Our results point to the fact that a sequence of lots each
of which contains the same number of items generates more revenue
than lots with varying number of items.
JEL codes: D44
Keywords: sequential auctions, declining prices.
1The authors want to thank Christie’s for making the data available and Joost Lebens
for excellent research assistance. The paper was presented at a Conference on auctions
organized by CORE and ECARES in Brussels in November 2001. We are grateful to
participants for their comments.
01 Introduction
Auction theory2 as well as the law of one price suggest that prices for identical
objects should be identiacl at one point in time and one location. Declining
prices in sequential auctions of identical objects is neverteless a pervasive
phenomenon, that has been observed for very diﬀerent auctions mechanisms
(English second price auctions, Dutch auctions in which the bid price falls
until a bidder stops the auction, etc.) and various items that appear at auc-
tion, such as livestock (Buccola, 1982), wool (Burns, 1985), wines (Ashenfel-
ter, 1989, McAfee and Vincent, 1993, Ginsburgh, 1998), prints (Pesando and
Shum, 1996), or ﬂowers (van den Berg, van Ours and Pradhan, 2001). The
same observation holds for heterogeneous objects, such as ﬂats (Ashenfelter
and Genesove, 1992), jewellery (Chanel, G´ erard-Varet and Vincent, 1996),
or paintings (Beggs and Graddy, 1997).
Several explanations have been given for this phenomenon which, since
it contradicts theory, literature came to call the declining price anomaly.3
Some authors also suggest that declining prices may be the result of the
institutional setting in which auctions are held.4
Most of the theoretical results are obtained for constant quantity lots
(often a unique item) of homogeneous objects. In many cases, however, the
number of items per lot in a parcel5 varies. This is so in wine auctions where
the number of bottles, or cases, in the sequence of otherwise identical lots
2Weber’s (1983) classical result with symmetric, risk neutral bidders who have iden-
tically, independently distributed private values drawn from a uniform distribution and
desire one unit, suggests that bidders should increase their bids over time (as the sale of
identical lots proceeds), and that hammer prices should, on average, be equal. See also
McAfee and McMillan (1987) or Wolfstetter (1996), or Laﬀont (1997).
3See among others, Milgrom and Weber (1982), Burns (1985), Ashenfelter (1989), Black
and de Meza (1992), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Bernhardt and Scoones (1994), Burguet
and Sakovics (1994), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), Gale and Hausch (1994), Von der Fehr
(1994), Branco (1997), Menezes and Monteiro (1997), Beggs and Graddy (1997).
4See Pesando and Schum (1996) or Ginsburgh (1998) for examples.
5In the sequel, we adopt the vocabulary used by Christie’s for wine auctions, where a
parcel consists of several lots of bottles of the same wine, vintage as well as chˆ ateau, sold
in sequence. The term item is used for an object in a lot.
1may vary.6 Costs are probably the main reason for lots with multiple items,
since this reduces the time during which the auction room is occupied,7 as
well as the time spent by the auctioneer, who is also often an art expert.
Buyers may also loose their interest in a sale that takes too much time.
Finally, professionals (restaurants and liquor shops in the case of wines, or
antiquaries for objects that we deal with in this paper) who attend such
auctions are often interested in buying several identical units.
In this paper, we analyze sequential auctions of shipwreck ﬁndings, orga-
nized by Christie’s organized in 1986, 1992 and 1995. The interest here is that
Christie’s used diﬀerent setups, varying both the number of lots in parcels
and the number of items in sequential lots, but also selling parcels in which
the number of lots contained constant, increasing or decreasing number of
identical items. Though the declining price anomaly is pervasive, these sales
have a “natural experiment” ﬂavor that may be used to examine whether
some sequences generate more revenue than others. If so, there may exist an
“optimal” way (that maximizes the seller’s revenue) of arranging the lots in
a parcel.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three sales
that are analyzed. As will be seen, the sequences of lots in speciﬁc parcels
share diﬀerent characteristics. There are cases in which lots contain the same
number of items (including of course those with one item each); there are also
instances in which the number of items increases or increases. In section 3,
we analyze whether these characteristics have an impact on the sequence of
hammer prices in a parcel. Section 4 tries to exploit the “natural experiment”
component of the three sales to infer whether some ways of organizing a parcel
are better than others. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
6The setting in the ﬂower auctions studied by van den Berg, van Ours and Pradhan
(2001) is also diﬀerent from the theoretical model. There it is the buyer who can decide
to choose, at the price at which he stops the clock, how many (constant quantity) lots he
wants to buy.
7One of the sales that we discuss in this paper was organized at the Hilton Hotel in
Amsterdam, and took ﬁve days, though many lots consisted of several items, in some
cases, up to several hundreds.
22 General characteristics of the sales
We analyze three sales of Chinese porcelain found in rescued ships that had
sunk 150 to 300 years ago in the South China Sea. All three sales were
organiszed by Christie’s in Amsterdam.
In the ﬁrst sale held in April 1986, over 100,000 pieces of blue and white
porcelain (as well as gold ingots) were oﬀered at auction during several
sessions which took about a week (from Monday April 28, to Friday May
2). These objects (including some 170 dinner services, 63,000 teacups and
saucers, 600 vomit pots, etc.) came from the so-called Nanking cargo,8 char-
tered by the Dutch East India Company, en route from Nanking to Holland,
and which contained some 700,000 pounds of tea, a much more valuable cargo
than the china that was on board only to provide the weight necessary to
“balance” the ship. The contents of the shipwreck belonged to, and were
sold by, Captain Hatcher who had discovered and salvaged the ship.
The second sale was organized a few years later, on April 7-8, 1992. The
objects auctioned during four sessions came from the recovery of another
ship, the Vung Tau,9 en route from Jakarta to Holland with 28,000 pieces of
Chinese porcelain (decorative wares, such as vases). The contents of the ship
belonged to the North Vietnamese government.
The third sale, the Diana cargo was held on March 5-6, 1995. The 1,319
lots needed six sessions to be sold. The Diana was a ship licensed to trade
between India and Canton, carrying cotton and opium to China and returning
with porcelain to India. She sunk in 1817, of the coast of Malacca, and was
salvaged in 1994 by Dorian Bell, managing director of a private company,
the Malaysian Historical Salvors. The cargo contained over eleven tons of
porcelain, 24,000 pieces, comprising 200 diﬀerent shapes.
All three sales, especially the ﬁrst one, were big hypes (see Beckett, 1995,
8The name Nanking stems from the port of origin of the ship, the true name of which
was probably Geldersmalen.
9In this case the name stems from the town oﬀ the Vietnamese coast were the ship was
found.
3pp. 91-104), and this obviously sheds some doubt about the “real” value
of the china, which sold for ﬁve to ten times over pre-sale estimates. In
the second sale for example, a dinner service estimated at £1,500 sold for
£3,000. Two days later, the dealer who had bought the vessel sold it for
£7,000, bought it back a week later for £15,000 and sold it for twice that
price. Today, it might fetch £4,000-5,000.10
Since in all three cases, the number of identical objects was very large,
these had to be sold in parcels some of which contained up to 91 diﬀerent lots
of one to 1,000 identical items. In Figure 1, we illustrate one typical case of
a sequence of 55 lots (no. 1515 to 1569 in the Nanking 1968 sale) of “peony
pattern in cylindrical mugs.” The ﬁrst 15 lots consist of a unique mug; the
next lots contain 2 mugs, a number that was subsequently increased to 4, 6,
8 and 12. The ﬁgure shows that the price per mug decreases very rapidly
from about 4,500 Dutch guilders to 2,000 guilders after lot number ﬁve. It
stabilizes to decrease somewhat again when the number of mugs per lot is
increased from one to two. After the further increase in the number of items
per lot, the price goes down to a level of about 500 guilders. The stylized
facts are thus the following. There is a strong price decline in the beginning
of the sequence, when the quantity per lot is constant. This is followed by a
further price decline as the quantity of items per lot increases.
Figure 2 gives the evolution of quantities and prices for the parcel of 27
lots (lots 894 to 920, containing “provincial blue and white saucers”) in the
second sale. As can be seen, the ﬁrst four lots contain 200 items each. Then,
the number drops to 120 and to 100, while the last lot contains 24 items.
Prices ﬂuctuate substantially over the sequence of lots. Some of the price
increases coincide with a drop in the quantity of items per lot, other price
increases do not.
Table 1 gives some general characteristics describing the three sales.11
10See The Art Newspaper 107, p. 66 (October 2000).
11In order to calculate a price change, we only use information concerning parcels in
which at least two lots were sold.
4The ﬁrst sale consists of 86 parcels auctioned in 2,102 lots, leading to an
average lot number of 24.4 per parcel and an average number of 1,100 items
per parcel. The other two sales are substantially smaller, with 6.5 and 11.8
lots per parcel, and a much smaller number of items per parcel. The ﬁrst and
the third sales feature a large number of cases with increases in the number
of items between lots in a parcel, and only very few declines. In the second
sale, there are many cases in which the number of items decreases between
successive lots. On average, in the ﬁrst auction there is a quantity increase
of 7.3%, while in the second sale there is an average decline of 8.0% in the
number of items. The lower part of Table 1 shows that there were both price
increases and decreases, the latter dominating the former. The average price
decline between two lots that follow each other within a parcel ranges from
4.0% in the ﬁrst sale to 1.7% in the second one. The declines in the second
and third sales are not thus as large as in the ﬁrst one.
The results of Table 1 show that there exist interesting diﬀerences between
the three sales. In sales 1 and 3, lots within a parcel have a tendency to
become larger: The number of items increases 269 times in sale 1 and 54 times
in sale 3, while it decreases only 9 and 6 times. The reverse is observed in sale
2 (7 increases and 122 decreases). These diﬀerences can be exploited to check
whether (a) changing the number of lots within a parcel, (b) changing the
number of items across lots within a parcel, and (c) increasing or decreasing
this number, may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the price decline. If so, then there
may be possibilities to design multiple-object sales in order to maximize the
revenue of the seller.
3 Declining prices
Declining prices seem to be the rule. However, the size of the price change
may depend on particular situations, such as the total number of items or of
lots in a parcel, on whether a lot is auctioned in the beginning or in the end
of the parcel, on whether the number of items in a lot is larger or smaller
5than the number of items in the lots that were sold before, on whether the
price of the last auctioned lot was above or below the pre-sale estimate, etc.
We illustrate the possible relationships between price changes and some of
the other variables in Figures 3 to 5.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between price changes and the loca-
tion of a lot in a parcel. On average, the price of the second lot is some
10% lower than the price of the ﬁrst one. As the sale proceeds, prices keep
declining, but the average changes ﬂuctuate substantially (between -2% and
- 8%); there is even a price increase between lots 20 and 21.12
Figure 4 relates price changes and total number of lots in a parcel. As
can be seen, the average price decline between two neighboring lots can be
as large as 20% for parcels consisting of two lots only. In larger parcels, the
decline varies between 2% and 10%. When it comes to the large price decline
associated to small parcels, there is of course an overlap between Figures 3
and 4. For parcels consisting of two lots only, there is only one price change.
Therefore, whether the large price decline in these small parcels is related to
the parcel or to the second lot having a substantially lower price in larger
parcels as well is something that we will consider later.
In sales 1 and 3, lots within a parcel have a tendency to contain more
objects than in sale 2. It turns out that price and quantity changes are
strongly related. To illustrate this, we split lots into seven groups, according
to the change in the number of items between two lots belonging to the same
parcel. In 67 cases, the decrease is larger than 50%, while in 187 cases, the
increase is larger than 50%. The details are given in Figure 5, which relates
changes in quantities to changes in the average prices computed over all lots
within a parcel. Small variations in the number of items are associated with
12Because of the diﬀerence in length of sequences, the average prices in Figure 3 are
based on diﬀerent numbers of lots in a parcel, since there are less parcels with a large
number of lots. For example, the average price change between the ﬁrst and the second
lot is based on 284 observations, while there are only 58 such observations on lots 20 and
21. As will be seen later, smaller parcels (i.e. with a smaller number of lots) have a
larger price decline than larger parcels. Therefore, the average price decline is somewhat
exaggerated.
6small price declines, but there is a clear negative relationship between the
two variables: quantity increases (declines) are associated with price declines
(increases).
All these observations convey the feeling that the hammer price dynamics
in a parcel can be partly explained, and the results used in designing a sale.
In particular, we illustrated that (given the number of lots in a parcel,
the number of items in each lot and the pre-sale estimate) the price decline
between two neighboring lots in a parcel is larger for the ﬁrst lots, for parcels
with a small number of lots, for parcels in which the number of items in the
sequence of lots is increasing and for lots in which the upper bound of the
pre-sale estimate of the previous lot is substantially below the hammer price.
This leads to estimate the following relation:
∆lnpit = β0 + β1dti=2 + β2Ti + β3pseit + β4 lnq
∗
it + β5 lnq
up
it + it,
where the βk, k = 0,1,...,5 are parameters, it is the error term, pit is the
hammer price of lot t (the lot number) in parcel i,13 dti=2 is a dummy variable
that takes the value one for lots sold second in a parcel, Ti is the total number
of lots in parcel i, pseit = pi,t−1/pmax
i,t−1 − 1 (pmax
i,t−1 is the upper bound of pre-
sale estimate), q∗
it = qi,t/qi,t−1 and q
up
it = qit/qi,t−1 if qit > qi,t−1. The three
last variables need some comments. First, pseit measures by how much the
hammer price of the previous lot in a parcel deviates from the upper bound
of the pre-sale estimate; it can be thought of as representing over- or under-
shooting, which will be “corrected” when the next lot is sold. Second, q∗
it
tries to capture the eﬀects of changing (increasing or decreasing) the number
of items in the lot that is auctioned, with respect to the previous one; adding
q
up
it to the model, makes it easy to test whether the eﬀect of increasing or
decreasing the number of items is asymmetric.
Results are reported in Table 2. In constant quantity lots (in which case
q∗ and qup are absent) the decrease of the price of the second lot is some
8% larger than for other lots in the same parcel. The total number of lots
13Lots are numbered in the sequence in which they are auctioned.
7in a parcel has a negative, but rather small, eﬀect on prices: The larger
this number, the larger the price decrease. Finally, “presale” has a negative
eﬀect: The larger the diﬀerence between the ratio “hammer price/upper
bound of the pre-sale estimate” of the previous lot, the larger the decrease of
the hammer price of the lot which is auctioned next.14 Over-shooting (and
under-shooting) is thus partially corrected.
For parcels in which the number of items in lots varies, the size and the
direction of the eﬀects are very close to those described for lots of identical
size. Of course here, we also have the size eﬀects of the previous lot (q∗
and qup), which appear to be signiﬁcantly asymmetric: If the number of
items increases, the price goes down more than it goes up when this number
decreases. The pooled results (identical lots and quantity varying lots) convey
the same qualitative results.15
A pecularity of the sales that we study is that, in many cases, the hammer
price is higher that the upper bound of the pre-sale estimate. It is very likely
that since the objects were uncommon, the auctionneer could hardly ﬁnd
previous sales on which to base his pre-sale estimates. But this in turn could
imply that the probability of underestimating an item (or a lot) is similar to
the probability of overestimating it. This appears to be wrong, since there
are only 11 parcels out of 284 for which the hammer price of the ﬁrst lot sold
is below the upper bound of the pre-sale estimate (and thus 273 for which
this price is above). Likewise, there are only 294 lots out of 3,794 for which
the hammer price is lower than the upper-bound of pre-sale estimate range.
This does not conform to the theoretical prediction that in order to maximize
his revenue, the seller should convey unbiased information to the buyers,16
but can be explained by the hype that was pervasive in the three sales.
14We also investigated whether the eﬀect was asymmetric, i.e. whether the coeﬃcients
for negative and positive “presale” values were diﬀerent, but we could ﬁnd no such eﬀect.
15Adding a variable representing the lot number that situates the lot in a parcel, does
not alter the results.
16This argument is made formal in Milgrom and Weber (1982) who show that in most
auction settings–ﬁrst-price, second-price and English auctions–, “honesty is the best pol-
icy” for the seller in the absence of reserve prices.
84 Organizing parcels
It seems clear than the seller can hardly avoid declining prices. One can
nevertheless wonder whether he has some control over the total revenue gen-
erated by a parcel. He faces three decisions:
(a) Set pre-sale estimates for an item (or for a lot). In most cases, prices of
items in a parcel are identical, irrespective of the size of a lot in the parcel;
prices vary only if the quality of items changes across lots;17
(b) Choose in how many lots he will regroup the Qi identical items;
(c) Decide whether the lots in a parcel will contain the same number of items
(e. g. 3 lots of 24 items each) or whether this number will vary (e.g. 12, 24
and 36), and if so, in which order the lots will be auctioned.
We assume that the pre-sale estimate is based on the intrinsic value of
the item, and is given before the two remaining decisions are made. We also
assume that these are made sequentially. The number of lots is set ﬁrst, and
only then, the auctioneer decides how the lots in a parcel will be organized.
Therefore, we ﬁrst look at decision (b), given that the auctioneer knows
the total number of items Qi in parcel i, and the pre-sale estimate (We use
the upper bound of the range of the pre-sale estimates). Our assumption is
that, given Qi, the more an item is valued, the smaller the number of such
items per lot, and thus, the larger the number of lots in a parcel. This leads
to a model in which the average number of items qi in a lot i is explained by
Qi and pmax
i (the upper bound of the range of the pre-sale estimate). Since
the three sales were organized diﬀerently, we also include a Sales dummy.
Estimation results, reported in Table 3, are very satisfactory, since we
are able to explain some 80% of the variance of the average number of lots
in the 284 parcels. Eq. (1) shows that when the total number of items
increases with one percent, the average lot size increases with 0.4%. This
17Such items or lots were eliminated from the data.
9may be interpreted as a consequence of the cost of organizing a sale, which
increases with the number of lots that are put up, since this increases the
eﬀort of the auctioneer, and takes more time. The results also show that,
as expected, the number of items in a lot will decrease with the price of the
item, since otherwise, lots may become too expensive. Since the quadratic
term in Eq. (2) is positive, this eﬀect is stronger for low pre-sale estimates.
Finally, conditional on Qi and pmax
i , the average lot size is smaller in the ﬁrst
(Nanking, 1986) sale than in the two others.
As suggested by the numbers given in Table 1, the shapes of the three
sales are quite diﬀerent. If these shapes matter, they should have an impact
on the average price of a parcel, other things being held constant.
We discarded twenty parcels containing lots in which the number of items
was both increasing and decreasing from one lot to the next, and concentrate
on those containing lots with only constant, only increasing or only decreas-
ing number of items. This led us to the numbers reported in Table 4, which
make apparent that Christie’s did run some experiments. In particular, the
proportion of parcels containing lots with identical number of items (“con-
stant” in Table 4) increases from 17% in sale 1 to 48% in sale 2 and 68% in
sale 3. This suggests that the seller must have noted that constant quantity
lots raise more revenue.
To verify this assumption, we estimate equations in which pi, the average
hammer price over lots in parcel i, is explained by the pre-sale estimate pmax
i ,
the total number of lots in a parcel Ti, and the shape of the lots, captured
here by a dummy variable (cld) that takes the value one for parcels in which
all the lots inlude the same number of items. The equation is speciﬁed as:
lnpi = γ0 + γ1 lnp
max
i + γ2cld + γ3Ti + i.
The results, given in Table 5, point to two conclusions that are present in all
the equations. First, the coeﬃcient of the pre-sale estimate variable (here, the
upper bound of the range of the pre-sale estimate, pmax
i ) is always signiﬁcantly
smaller than one. Second, the total number of lots hardly has a signiﬁcant
10eﬀect (0.3% per lot). Finally, the constant quantity dummy always picks
positive coeﬃcients, though the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the usual 5% level in two cases. The three sales can however be pooled
(the LR-test statistic is equal to 9, while the critical value with 5 degrees
of freedom is 11.1), and the γ2 coeﬃcient turns then out to be signiﬁcantly
positive. This suggests that parcels that contain lots with a the same number
of items (say, 24, 24, 24) pick average hammer prices that are some 30% larger
than other, “non constant” parcels (12, 24, 36).18 This is consistent with
Christie’s behavior to increase, over time, the number of constant quantity
lots.
The fact that lots with the same number of items do better comes as
a surprise insofar as this is almost never the case for wine auctions, where
the number of bottles in the sequence of lots of the same wine is very often
increasing. Indeed, one may think that if buyers are heterogeneous (some
willing to buy more items than others), it should be better to vary the number
of items, since this will generate more competition for each (diﬀerentiated)
lot. This is obvioulsy not the case, and may be due to the possibility buyers
have to trade after the auction. But even this is not beneﬁcial since they
pay more per item than in the case of lots of varying number of items. In
addition to the declining price anomaly there also seems to be a constant
number of items anomaly.
5 Conclusions
We analyze a large number of some very long sequences of auctions of lots
including varying quantities of identical items (parcels). In Section 3, we
focus on whether price changes within such a parcel can be explained. In
Section 4, we study price (and therefore, income) diﬀerences between parcels.
18Adding a dummy for lots with decreasing (or increasing) number of items in the pooled
regression did not turn out signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient is -0.02 with a t-statistic equal to
0.2. Other coeﬃcients do not change.
11Like in previous studies, we ﬁnd evidence of declining prices in sequences
of identical objects. The large number of items, the large number of lots in
many parcels as well as the fact that in some sequences, the number of items
in neighboring lots is decreasing, constant or increasing, makes it possible
to estimate the eﬀects of various underlying characteristics. In particular,
we ﬁnd that (a) the average price decline is smaller in long sequences; (b)
it is especially large for the ﬁrst pair of lots auctioned; (c) it is larger when
the price of the previous lot was larger than (the upper bound of the range
of) the pre-sale estimate; (d) it is larger when the number of items in the
sequence of lots increases.
Therefore it looks as if the seller may have some control over the sequence
of prices and, consequently, on the total income of a parcel, by deciding on
the pre-sale estimate, the number of lots in a parcel, the number of items
in the sequence of lots as well as the changes in the number of items across
lots. It is hard to assess the inﬂuence of the pre-sale estimate, and the only
reasonable assumption we can make is that it represents the fundamental
value of the item. It also appears that the number of lots has almost no
inﬂuence on the average price. The only important eﬀect is generated by the
number of items in a lot: Lots which contain an identical number of items
generate more revenue.
The contribution of our ﬁndings is twofold. First, there seems to be
no way of avoiding declining prices, though the auctioneer may have some
control over the magnitude of the decline. Second, the auctioneer does also
have some control over the total income of a parcel, by splitting it into
constant quantity lots. This simple setup increases his income, and this was
indeed the strategy followed by Christie’s who, over time, decided to increase
the proportion of such lots.
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Characteristics of the sales
Sales No. of No. of parcels with No. of No. of lots No. of items
parcels 10 lots at least lots per parcel per parcel
Sale 1 86 60 2,102 24.4 1,100
Sale 2 121 21 783 6.5 162
Sale 3 77 34 909 11.8 217
Together 284 115 3,794 13.4 461
Sales No. of quantity No. of quantity Av. quantity
increases declines change (%)
Sale 1 269 9 7.3
Sale 2 7 122 -8.0
Sale 3 54 6 2.7
Together 330 137 3.4
Sales No. of price No. of price Av. price
increases declines change (%)
Sale 1 490 850 -4.0
Sale 2 255 287 -1.7
Sale 3 198 366 -3.7
Together 943 1,503 -3.5
16Table 2
Estimation Results. Price Changes within Parcels
Constant Varying All
quantity lots quantity lots parcels
Intercept 0.031 -0.020 -0.013
(1.4) (2.2) (1.7)
Second lot sold (dt=2) -0.084 -0.072 -0.071
(3.0) (3.5) (4.4)
Total no. of lots (T) -0.0020 0.0006 0.0005
(1.7) (4.1) (3.5)
Pre-sale estimate (pse) -0.012 -0.007 -0.008
(3.5) (3.8) (4.7)
Quant. change (lnq∗) - -0.386 -0.382
- (9.8) (9.7)
Quant. increase (lnqup) - 0.059 0.055
- (2.3) (2.2)
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.182 0.147
No. of observations 753 2,757 3,510
The dependent variable is ∆lnpit. The t-statistics which appear between
brackets under the coeﬃcients, are based on robust regression techniques.
17Table 3
Estimation Results. Average Number of Items in a Lot
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Intercept 0.87 5.14
(5.2) (6.5)
Sale 2 dummy 0.19 0.27
(3.2) (5.6)
Sale 3 dummy -0.08 0.06
(1.3) (1.4)
No. of items (ln Qi) 0.37 -0.11
(13.5) (2.8)
No. of items squared (ln Q2
i) - 0.07
- (11.6)
Pre-sale estimate (ln pmax
i ) -0.19 -1.23
(8.2) (6.0)
Pre-sale estimate squared (ln (pmax
i )2) - 0.07
- (5.2)
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.859
No. of observations 284 284
The dependent variable is ln qi, the (log of the) average number of items in a lot
of parcel i. The t-statistics which appear between brackets under the coeﬃcients,
are based on robust regression techniques.
Results are obtained by weighted least squares regressions, where the weights
used are the number of lots in a parcel. OLS results are very similar.
18Table 4
Number of identically organized parcels in each sale
No. of items/lot Sale 1 Sale 2 Sale 3 Total
Constant 13 55 50 118
Increasing 64 - 23 87
Decreasing - 59 - 59
Total 77 114 73 264
Twenty parcels that appear in Table 1 have been discarded.
See text for the details.
19Table 5
Estimation Results. Average Prices
Sale 1 Sale 2 Sale 3 All sales
Intercept 2.79 3.53 3.48 3.54 3.61
(5.4) (9.0) (6.6) (16.2) (15.6)
Pre-sale estimate (ln pmax,i) 0.81 0.69 0.58 0.69 0.69
(9.7) (14.1) (8.4) (22.3) (22.0)
Constant quantity lots dummy 0.35 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.24
(1.6) (3.5) (1.3) (4.0) (3.5)
Sale 3 dummy - - - -0.99 -0.99
- - - (15.5) (15.4)
No. of lots (Ti) - - - - -0.003
- - - - (1.7)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.694 0.577 0.739 0.741
Log. likelihood -49.2 -74.3 -40.9 -168.9 -167.7
No. of parcels 77 114 73 264 264
The dependent variable is ln pi, the (log of the) price of a standardized lot in each
parcel (we chose as standard lot in the parcel the one that contained the smallest
number of items).
The t-statistics which appear between brackets under the coeﬃcients, are based on
robust regression techniques.
20Figure 1 Prices and quantities 
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